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KEYNOTE ADDRESS: THE T-TEAM
Michael P. Schmf-1:

Professor Michael Lawrence:

It's a real pleasure to welcome our Keynote Speaker, Professor Michael
Scharf. Professor Scharf is the John Deaver Drinko-Baker and Hofstetler
Professor of Law and Director of the Frederick K. Cox Intemational Law
Center at Case Westem Reserve University School ofLaw.
In 2004 and 2005, Professor Scharf served as a member of the
intemational team of experts that provided training to the Judges of the Iraqi
High Tribunal. In 2006, he led the first training session for the Investigative
Judges and Prosecutors of the newly established, UN-backed Cambodian
Genocide Tribunal, 1 and in November 2008 he served as Special Assistant
to the Prosecutor of the Cambodia Tribunal. He is currently co-leader of a
USAID-funded project to assist the government of Uganda in establishing a
special war crimes trials and truth commission. In February 2005, Professor
Scharf and the Public Intemational Law and Policy Group-an NGO he cofounded-were nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize for the work they have
done to help in the prosecution of major war criminals, such as Slobodan
Milosevic, Charles Taylor, and Sadaam Hussein. During the elder Bush and
Clinton Administrations, Professor Scharf served in the Office of the Legal
Advisor of the U.S. Department of State where he held the positions of
Attomey-Advisor for Law Enforcement and Intelligence, Aitomey-Advisor
for UN Affairs, and Delegate to the UN Human Rights Commission.
A graduate of Duke University School of Law, where he graduated with
high honors and Order of the Coif, he was Judicial Clerk on the 11th Circuit
Federal Court of Appeals and is the author of over seventy scholarly articles
and thirteen books, including three that have won National Book ofthe Year
awards. His latest book is Shaping Foreign Policy in Times of Crisis,
published by Cambridge University Press in 2010. Professor Scharf has
also testified before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the
House Armed Services Committee and appears frequently in the national
and intemational media.

* This address by Michael P. Scharf was presented at the MSU Journal of
International Law Symposium titled, "Is There a War on Terror? Torture, Rendition,
Guantanamo, and Obama's Preventive Detention" at Michigan State University College of
Law in February 2010.
I. The official name of the Court is the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic
Kampuchea. It was established by the Cambodian National Assembly in 2001. Introduction:
Extraordinary
Chambers
in
the
Courts
of
Cambodia,
http://www.eccc.gov.lch/english/about_eccc.aspx (last visited Oct. 28, 201 0).
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It's a great honor, as I said, to have Professor Scharf with us here this
evening. We really appreciate [him] corning. Please join me in welcoming
Professor Scharf.

Professor Michael Schmf"
Thank you so much, Professor Lawrence, for that kind welcome. The
topic I'm going to be speaking about today is related to my new book,
Shaping Foreign Policy in Times of Crisis. 2 Based on qualitative empi1ical
data, the book examines whether government legal advisers and policymakers have perceived international law as real law, and whether they have
ever passed up their foreign policy preferences so as not to violate
international law.
The book includes a chapter called Lavvyering the War on Terror, which
I want to focus my remarks on this evening. The chapter tells the
extraordinary story of how, in the months following the attacks of 9/11, the
legal policy of the U.S. government with respect to the War on Terror was
hijacked and dictated by a cabal of four govemment lawyers who called
themselves the "War Council." They could just as easily have been called
the "Torture Team," or "T-Team" for short because together, this team of
highly-placed government lawyers produced a series of legal memorandawhich deliberately ignored adverse precedent, misrepresented legal
authority, and were written to support a pre-ordained result. 3
The ominous presence behind the group was Vice President Dick
Cheney, who sought to unshackle the President from the restraints posed by
the Geneva Conventions, 4 the UN Convention against Torture, 5 and the
federal laws that implement those treaties. In his words, "[ w ]hen you
contemplate the 9/11 [attack] with terrorists instead of being anned with
box cutters and airline tickets, equipped with a nuclear weapon or a
biological agent of some kind in the middle of one of our cities and think

2.

MICHAEL P. SCHARF

& PAUL R. WILLIAMS, SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY IN TiMES OF

CRISIS: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISER

(2010).
3. Office of Prof! Responsibility, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Report oflnvestigation into
the Office of Legal Counsel's Memorandum Concerning Issues into the Cent. Intelligence
Agency's Use of "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques" on Suspected Terrorists 160 (2009)
[hereinafter
Office
of
Prof!
Responsibility
Report],
available
at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/OPRFina!Report090729.pdf. See also id. at 3, 9, 5152,159,226,227,228.
4. The
Geneva
Conventions
of
1949,
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteengO.nsf/htmlall/genevaconventions {last visited Oct 28,
2010).
5. United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 12, 1984, i465 U.N.T.S. 85.
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about the consequences of that and then I think we're justified in taking
bold action." 6
The self-anointed "War Council" was led by Vice President Cheney's
Chief Counsel and trusted lieutenant, David Addington-about whom it
was said, "if you favored international law, you were in danger of being
called 'soft on terrorism. "'7 The second dominant figure was Jim Haynes,
the Chief Counsel of the Department of Defense-a political appointee who
had served as Best Man at Addington's wedding. 8 The third figure in this
group was White House Chief Counsel Alberto Gonzales-a life-long
friend of the President George W. Bush who famously declared after the
2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan that the Geneva Conventions were
"quaint" and "outmoded" and did not apply to this new War on Terror. 9
But the most important member of all turned out to be a young Berkeley
Law Professor named John Y oo, a hired gun placed as Deputy Head of the
Department of Justice's Office of Legal Cmmsel (OLC), a government office with extraordinary power to issue memos interpreting the government's
requirements under the United States Constitution and federal statutes. Yoo
had come to the White House's attention because he had authored a series
of law review articles arguing for near limitless powers of the Presidency
during crisis. 10 He was a true believer and a prolific writer-and it was his
work product that would in a few years garner the mantle "White House
Tmture Memos." 11
My book recounts the story about how these four individuals intentionally cut off the government's primary experts on the Geneva Conventions,
the Torture Convention, and customary international law from the decisionmaking process, and thereby presented a one-sided and distorted view of
U.S. obligations under international law that led to a widespread government policy and practice of torture. According to a bi-partisan December
2008 Senate Aimed Services Committee Report, "[t]hose OLC opinions
distmted the meaning and intent of anti-tmture laws, rationalized the abuse
of detainees in U.S. custody and influenced Department of Defense determinations as to what interrogation techniques were legal for use during interrogations conducted by U.S. military persom1el." 12
6. Interview by Jonathan Karl with Dick Cheney, Vice President of the United
States,
in
Wash.,
D.C.
(Dec.
15,
2008),
available
at
http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=6464697.
7. PHJLIPPE SANDS, ToRTURE TEAM 213 (2008).
8. !d.
9. Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to President George W. Bush,
(Jan. 25, 2002), reprinted in 37 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 615 app. (2006).
10. Office of Prof! Responsibility Report, supra note 2, at 26, 122.
1 I. Office of Prof! Responsibility Report, supra note 2, at 227 ("According to [CIA
Director] Rizzo, there was never any doubt that waterboarding would be approved by Y oo,
and the client clearly regarded OLC as willing to find a way to achieve the desired result.").
12. S. Armed Services Comm., I 1Oth Cong., Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees
in U.S. Custody, xxvii (2008) [hereinafter Senate Armed Services Committee Inquiry].
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How did they get away with it? To accomplish their goal, first the "War
Council" sought to convince the President and other officials that
international law was not real law. They discredited efforts to use law or
legal institutions to challenge U.S. detention and interrogation policies by
labeling it "lawfare." Next, they took actions calculated to cut the State
Department Legal Adviser out of the "clearance process" concernmg
treatment of detainees.
The State Department Legal Adviser has long been known as
"[Amelica's] conscience on international law." 13 Unlike the lawyers
involved in the "War Council," the State Department Legal Adviser must be
confirmed by the Senate, which ensures that persons with radical
conceptions of the law will not be appointed to the post. The Legal
Adviser's opinion draws on the expertise of 170 international legal experts
in the office, many of whom have been in the government for many years.
Therefore, they not only have greater expertise in international law than
attorneys in OLC or the White House, but also have more interactions with
foreign counterparts and more experience regarding the consequences of
violating international law on American foreign policy.
In his 2006 memoir of his days at OLC, John Yoo writes: "The State Department and OLC often disagreed about international law. State believed
that international law had a binding effect on the President, indeed on the
United States, both internationally and domestically;" whereas Yoo and the
other members of the "War Council" did not hold to that view. 14 William
Taft, who was the State Department Legal Adviser at the time, observed
that his office was likely excluded from the decision-making process due to
the fear that "in light of some of the positions we had taken, that we would
not agree with some of the conclusions other lawyers in the Bush Administration expected to reach and that we might 'leak' information about the
work to the press." 15 The "War Council" even used heightened categories of
classification in order to keep the State Department Legal Adviser out of the
loop. 16 In other words, they classified the draft torture memos as "need to
know" and then maintained that the Legal Adviser did not actually have
such a need.
From this case study, one might speculate that over the years State
Department Legal Advisers have often been cut out of the clearance process
by policy-makers who view international law as an obstacle to attaining
national seculity goals. To test that supposition, my Shaping Foreign
Policy in Times of Crisis co-author, Paul Williams, and I assembled the ten
living former Legal Advisers-going all the way back to the Carter
13.
14.
TERROR 33
15.
16.

SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at XV.
JOHN Yoo, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON
(2006).
SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 130.
Office ofProf1 Responsibility Report, supra note 3, at 260, 122.
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Administration-for a day-long discussion at the Carnegie Endowment.
We asked them each to tell us about the role of international law during the
crises that unfolded during their tenure in the Office.
Somewhat surprisingly, the Legal Advisers provided numerous examples
of times they counseled the President against a proposed action which the
Legal Adviser opined would violate international law. Sometimes the
position of the Legal Adviser did not carry the day, but usually, they said,
the President backed down. Often this led to the adoption of third options
that did not contravene intemationallaw. As Michael Matheson, who spent
thirty years in the State Department's Office of the Legal Advisor (several
as Acting Legal Adviser), summed up: "So there really is a spectrum in
which perhaps only on the extreme end of the spectrum does intemational
law always win the day, but even on other parts of the spectrum,
international law is a definite constraint on policymakers." 17
Sadly, the Legal Advisers also shared stories of a handful of other
times-like the case of the torture memos-where the Legal Advisor was
intentionally cut out of the process. It didn't happen often-in fact, they
related only four occasions during the past thirty years. The Legal Advisers
mentioned the following cases in which they were purposely cut out of the
decision making process: the 1980s mining of Nicaraguan harbors and
anned support for the Contras, the 1990 kidnapping of Dr. AlvarezMachain from Mexico, and-as described above-the adoption of policies
related to treatment of detainees in the aftermath of 9/11. 18
Interestingly, in each such case, the same policy-makers that cut the
State Department Legal Adviser out of the decision-making process ended
up seeking the Legal Adviser's assistance in crafting after-the-fact legal
justifications for the decisions and actions taken. As Stephen Schwebel, a
former Deputy Legal Adviser who later served as President of the
Intemational Court of Justice, once remarked: "[t]he [Legal Adviser] is
always called in to pick up the pieces even if he was not influentially
involved in the initial decision." 19 Thus, in relation to the mining of
Nicaragua's harbors, former Legal Adviser Davis Robinson said:
"As it turned out, all that the lawyers could contribute was assistance in
after-the-fact containment of a train wreck. I remember one Secretary of
State under whom I served stating, 'I have only one rigid rule and that is,
don't ever let me be blindsided.' I can only have wished that this sensible
rule had applied to L [the Office of the Legal Adviser] as well." 20

17. SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 155.
18. ld.at211-12.
19. Stephen M. Schwebel, Remarks on the Role ofthe Legal Advisor of the U.S. State
Departme111, 2 EUR. J. lNT'L L. 132, 134 (1991 ).
20. SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 212.
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For a comparative perspective on this problem, we h1med to former UK
Foreign Ministry Legal Adviser Sir Frank Berman. He told us that "the
most notorious incident where the UK Legal Adviser was deliberately cut
out of the loop was the 1956 Suez invasion."21 Berman said, however, that
the UK govemment had leamed from that mishap and had adopted policies
to ensure against a repeat. In his words:
"[i]t is [now] considered a cardinal sin within the UK Foreign Office to put
up a policy submission that did not clearly recite that the Legal Adviser or
his staff had been consulted, or which did not include an analysis of the
legal questions which were relevant to the decision. If the submission did
not contain this, then any legitimate senior official or minister would send
it back for a complete analysis to know what the law stated. " 22

The United States would do well to adopt a similar intemal mle requiring
the State Department Legal Adviser's input on policy matters involving
international law. As Davis Robinson summed up:
"The main lesson that I drew from my days [as Legal Adviser] is that, if
the U.S. Government is to realize the full benefit of the potential
contribution of its international lawyers, the lawyers need to participate
from the beginning of a take-off in policy and not just in a crash landing
23
whenever things go wrong. "

Now let me him to the big picture. As I mentioned earlier, one of the
aims of the "War Council" was to convince policy-makers that intemational
law is not real law. That quest was later taken to a larger audience by
Professor Jack Goldsmith of Harvard Law School. In his 2007 memoir, The
Terror Presidency, Goldsmith identifies himself as "part of a group of
conservative intellectuals--dubbed 'new sovereigntists' in Foreign Affairs
magazine-who were skeptical about the creeping influence of intemational
law on American law."24 Together with Professor Eric Posner of University
of Chicago Law School, in 2005 Goldsmith wrote The Limits of
International Law/5 a potentially revolutionary work26 that employs rational

21. Jd.
22. Jd.
23. SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 213.
24. JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 21 (2007). ("My academic objections to this trend were based on the
need for democratic control over the norms that governed American conduct. My
scholarship argued against the judicial activism that gave birth to international human rights
lawsuits in U.S. courts. It decried developments in 'customary international law' that
purported to bind the United States to international rules to which the nation's political
leaders had not consented.").
25. JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2005).
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choice theory to argue that international law is really just "politics" and that
it is no more unlawful to contravene a treaty or a rule of customary
international law than it would be to disregard a non-binding letter of
intent. 27 Goldsmith and Posner conclude that States have no preference for
compliance with international law, they are unaffected by the "legitimacy"
of a rule of law, past consent to a rule does not generate compliance, and
decision-makers do not intemalize a norm of compliance with intemational
law. According to Goldsmith and Posner, States employ intemational law
when it is convenient, are free to ignore it when it is not, and have every
1ight to place their sovereign interests first-indeed, democratic States have
an obligation to do so when intemational law threatens to undermine
federalism, separation of powers, and domestic sovereignty. 28
While serving as Special Counsel to Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld, and later as Assistant Attomey General in charge of the Office of
Legal Counsel in the Bush Administration, Goldsmith saw it as his mission
to convince those inside the govemment that intemational rules that
constrain U.S. power-and thus compromise national security-are not
really binding. A 2003 inter-agency memo prepared by Goldsmith, titled
"The Judicialization of Intemational Politics," wams: "In the past quarter
cenhrry, various nations, NGOs, academics, intemational organizations, and
others in the 'intemational community' have been busily weaving a web of
intemational laws and judicial institutions that today threatens US
Government interests." The memo continues:
"The US Government has seriously underestimated this threat, and has
mistakenly assumed that confronting the threat will worsen it. Unless we
tackle the problem head-on, it will continue to grow. The issue is
especially urgent because of the unusual challenges we face in the war on
terrorism. " 29

The Limits of International Law can be understood as Goldsmith's effort
to bring this "anti-lawfare" argument to a wider audience.
26. George Washington University Law Professor Edward Swaine writes that U.S.
elites may seize on Goldsmith/Posner's book to justify noncompliance with international law
and may have done so already. Edward Swaine, Restoring and (Risldng) Interest in
International Law, I 00 AM. J. lNT'L L. 259 (2006). University of Maryland Law Professor
David Gray has opined that Goldsmith/Posner's views "are sure to become standard currency
in international law theory and practice." David Gray, Rule-Skepticism, 'Stratege1y, 'and the
Limits ofInternational Law, 46 VA. J. lNT'L L. 563, 583 (2006).
27. GOLDSMITH & PosNER, supra note 23, at 90; See also Eric Posner, Do States
Have a Moral Obligation to Obey International Law? 55 STAN. L. REv. 1901, 1901 (2003).
28. Goldsmith and Posner are particularly concerned about international law's
propensity to shift decisional authority from local government and the federal executive to
international institutions and activist federal judges. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note
25.
29. GOLDSMITH, supra note 24, at 60.
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As Professor Allen Buchanan of Duke University has pointed out,
Goldsmith and Posner's "normative claims, if valid, would lend support to
the view that it is wholly permissible for the U.S. government to take a
purely instrumental stance toward international law, and that its citizens do
not have a moral obligation to try to prevent their government from doing
so."30 Similarly, Professor Oona Hathaway of Yale Law School has
concluded that there is a necessary connection between Goldsmith and
Posner's underlying "revisionist" political agenda and their book's
methodological approach and conclusions. 31 And as Professor Margaret
McGuinness of University of Missouri-Columbia observes: "The book
cannot be viewed as separate from the authors' broader normative projecta project that seeks to minimize U.S. participation in international
institutions and to limit the application of international law in the United
States by expanding presidential power and limiting the role of the
judicimy." 32 Finally, Professor Mary Ellen O'Connell of Notre Dame
warns, "[a] policymaker reading the book might well conclude that
compliance with international law, such as the 1949 Geneva Conventions or
the Convention against Torture, is optional.. .. " 33
Goldsmith and Posner draw their conclusions by examining government
decision-making from outside an opaque box. According to Professor
Andrew T. Guzman of California-Berldey's Boalt Hall School of Law,
Goldsmith and Posner rely on a selective use of a handful of case studies
which are no more than anecdotal in nature, and their identification of the
controlling state interests in each is almost entirely conjechtral. 34 Professor
David Golove of New York University observes that "Goldsmith and
Posner make little effort to investigate direct historical evidence . . . of the
achml motivations of the individuals who made the decisions on which they
focus. Instead, they focus ... on the events themselves and draw speculative
inferences about why States acted as they did. " 35 By employing the
qualitative empirical data obtained from the day-long conference of State

30. Allen Buchanan, Democracy and the Commitment to International Law, 34 GA.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 306, 307-08 (2006).
3 1. Oona A. Hathaway & Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Rationalism and Revisionism in
International Law, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1404, 1404 (2006).
32. Margaret E. McGuinness, Exploring the Limits of International Human Rights
Law, 34 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 393, 421 (2006).
33. MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL, THE POWER AND PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
104 (2009).
34. Andrew T. Guzman, The Promise of International Law, 92 VA. L. REv. 533, 540
(2006) (arguing that Goldsmith and Posner misrepresent the facts in their international trade
case study); David M. Go love, Leaving CustomGiy International Law Where it is: Goldsmith
and Posner's The Limits of International Law, 34 GA. J. INT'L COMP. L. 333, 355-57
(2006) (arguing that Goldsmith and Posner's account is "cherry-picked and fails to present a
fair picture of the 'Free Ships, Free Goods'" example).
35. Golove, supra note 34, at 348.
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Department Legal Advisers, my book seeks to fill the void, enabling the
reader to discern which side of the debate better reflects reality.
Goldsmith and Posner assert that the decision-makers do not perceive a
moral commitment to comply with international law in the same way they
do domestic law. The findings set forth in my book indicate that this might
in fact be true. The Legal Advisers really weren't the type that would put
much stock on the so-called "moral authority" of the law. They were a
practical bunch, perhaps leaning toward the "realist" school. But at the
same time, they would likely ascribe to Luis Henkin's observation that
"realists who do not recognize the uses and the force of law are not
realistic." 36 Thus, while not based on so-called "moral pull," it turned out
that the Legal Advisers nonetheless felt a strong sense of obligation to
comply with international law based on concems about reputation as a lawabiding State, long-tenn self-interest in the maintenance of order, and/or
long-tenn self-interest in a functioning legal system.
The Legal Advisers all recognized (and advised policy makers) that
violations can engender intemational condemnation, strain relations with
allies, and interfere with the ability of the United States to obtain
international suppmi for important policy initiatives-in particular in
fighting international tenorism, suppressing naTcotics trafficking,
controlling weapons of mass destruction, and achieving fair and free trade.
Moreover, the Legal Advisers recognized that when a State elects to ignore
or reinterpret an existing intemational rule according to its own short tenn
interests, it runs the risk of being unable to invoke the rule in the future, to
its ultimate detriment.
Let me say a few words about reputation, which Goldsm.ith and Posner
dismiss as undeserving of serious consideration. It h1rns out that America's
controversial policies concerning treatment of detainees began to affect U.S.
diplomatic power over a broad spectrum of issues, including gaining foreign
support for efforts in the War on Tenor, the war against drugs, the war
against com1ption, and global wanning. It made it hard for America's
negotiators-in a host of foreign and international forums-to do their job.
The bi-partisan Commission that investigated the September 11th attacks
concluded in a 2005 report that "[t]he U.S. policy on treating detainees is
undelTllining the war on tenorism by tamishing America's reputation as a
moral leader."37 The bi-partisan 2008 Senate Committee Report similarly
observed: "The impact of those abuses has been significant. " 38 Citing polls
indicating that Abu GhTaib and Guantanamo Bay have generated negative

36. See SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 214 (the author argues here, as he did
in his cited work, that Luis Henkin's observation may be appropriately applied to
international law).
37. Barbara Slavin, Abuse of Detainees Undercuts U.S. Authority, 9111 Panel Says,
USA TODAY, Nov. 15,2005, at SA.
38. Senate Anned Services Committee Inquiry, supra note 12, at xxv.
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perceptions of the United States as a country that does not respect or abide
by the rule of law by the populations and government officials of countries
around the globe-including our closest democratic allies-the Committee
concluded "[t]he fact that America is seen in a negative light by so many
complicates our ability to attract allies to our side, strengthens the hand of
our enemies, and reduces our ability to collect intelligence that can save
lives. " 39 Consequently, concern about reputation is a much more important
factor in detennining compliance with international law than Goldsmith and
Posner have acknowledged-especially in a situation where the initial
decision to depati from international obligations produced such immediate
and significant reputational costs.
So, in the end, my book aims to confront head-on the argument that
Goldsmith and Posner make in their book; it's sort of the yin to their yang.
It documents many cases in which, at the State Department Legal Adviser's
counsel, the methods selected or the justifications employed were shaped to
comply with international law. Contrary to Goldsmith and Posner's
hypothesis, the Legal Advisers have managed to convince decision-makers
that international law is real law, and that the advantages of complying with
it almost always outweigh the shOii-tenn benefits of breaching it. Thank
you. I'm now happy to answer your questions.
Question:

Did the Legal Advisers ever discuss whether they considered resigning
when their advice was not followed?
Professor Scharf

All of the Legal Advisers said that they considered resigning at some point
during their tenure. They also said that you cannot have a job in
government as a lawyer, especially at the top of an agency like the Office of
the Legal Adviser, unless you go in !mowing that you might have to resign
one day on principle. They said that if you're a lawyer and you aren't
willing to resign, you don't have any cards to use against the policymakers. And you will not have any moral authority-if you feel compelled
to stay on-no matter what. Directly on point is the story of Elizabeth
Wilmshurst-the Acting Legal Adviser of the UK Ministry of Foreign
Affairs-who resigned when her memo concluding that it would be
unlawful to invade Iraq in 2003 was disregarded by the Prime Minister. But
Ms. Wilmshurst couldn't go to the press and say "I'm resigning because
they didn't follow my advice and they're breaking international law in a
really big way." Why? Because as a lawyer she was subject to the attorneyclient privilege of confidentiality. So she quietly resigned, she joined
39.

!d.
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Chatham House as a professor, and nobody would have known about her
memo if it were not for the fact that someone else in the government
subsequently leaked it to the press. So why didn't the U.S. Legal Advisers
resign? I think part of the explanation is that they realized that, in each
case, the resignation would not have made a huge difference, and that their
legal advice was needed to try to clean up the mess. But if things had gotten
really bad, they all said that what Elizabeth Wilmshurst did was 1ight.

Question:
I'd like to probe on the mle oflaw a little bit, and I wouldn't have expected
you to cover this in your speech, but there is usually conflict between the
State Department and the Defense Department and Justice Department. An
example of the conflict over rule of law would be the case of Medellin v.
Texas, 40 where President Bush did follow the advice of the State
Department-against the advice of the Justice Depmiment-to honor
international law in tenns of our consular treaty. But on the other hand, the
way he chose to do it was a rather clear violation of our Constitution, and
the Supreme Court so held. So do you have any reaction to that kind of
situation?

Schaif:
The Legal Advisor at the time, who was Jolm Bellinger, used that example
as one where the President acted against his personal and political interests
to try to uphold international law. Bellinger said that President Bush was
from a state, Texas, where they are very much in favor of the death penalty.
In fact when he ran for President, Bush bragged about how many times he
had signed execution orders. And Bush personally thought that this awful
guy, Medellin, who had been responsible for a terrible rape and murder,
should be executed. On the other hand, the State Department Legal Adviser
advised the President that the ICJ had ruled that the United States has to
give Medellin a new sentencing hearing because he was not told upon his
arrest that as a Mexican citizen he had the right to consult with a consular
officer. It potentially could have made a difference in his case because his
strategy at trial was to say, "look, I did a terrible, heinous thing, I'm awful, I
hate myself, you should hate me too, I should be killed." In his culture that
was how you show remorse and contrition, and how you seek forgiveness.
But in Texas, if a murderer says to the jury, "I should be killed," they're
going to oblige him. His consular officer could have explained all of that to
him, so this really could have made a difference to the outcome of the case.
And so Bellinger urged the President to issue an Executive Order that would
implement the ICJ decision, requiring Texas to hold a new sentencing
40.
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hearing. Ultimately the Supreme Court ruled that the President did not have
the power to force the State of Texas to stay the execution because the
Statute of the ICJ is a non-self-executing treaty and only the Congress can
implement it through a federal statute. So in retrospect, Bellinger should
have advised the President to go to Congress and get a law that implements
the ICJ Statute, or authorizes the President to do so. And in fact, there is
legislation pending right now that will do that, which hopefully Congress
will approve soon. From reading the Executive's briefs, I don't think this
was just a clever strategy to mollify the international community without
enforcing the ICJ's decision. But perhaps it does suggest that Bellinger was
a better international lawyer than a Constitutional lawyer.
Follow up Question:
So we ended up violating international law while upholding the
Constitution. My question is, which law has priority?
Schmf
Well, domestically, there have been a seties of U.S. cases that uphold our
Constihttion over treaties and customary international law. That doesn't
excuse us from violating international law, though. There is a wellaccepted international law mle that a country can't use its internal
Constihttional decisions or statutes as an excuse for non-perfornmnce of
intemational obligations. So, the Legal Advisor serves as the government's
conscience on international law. But it's absolutely right that there should
be other government officials that focus on Constitutional law. And when
there is a possible conflict, the important thing is for the Legal Adviser to
advise the president that there will be international consequences.
Questionfi'om Scott Horton:
I'd like to ask you a little bit more about Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner's
book, which I think you make amazing use of here. There's a statement in
their book, a contention put forward aggressively, that individuals may
never be the subject of international law, and may never be punished under
intemationallaw, which would be rather shocking to people who are put on
trial at places like Nuremburg-not to mention the intemational criminal
tribunals that you've worked so long with. And indeed, while you see at the
beginning a passing reference to intemational humanitarian law to be
developed in a later chapter, when you look through the book you discover
it's not there. And it's like they've wished this into oblivion, because it
doesn't seem to meet their prescriptions. But on the other hand, is it fair to
say here they're not describing international law as it is, because they
obliterated all that? Instead, are they trying to describe a new international
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law that they want to create, in which there is no role for the Geneva
Convention, the Convention against torture, and so forth?
Schaif:
I absolutely agree with your conclusion, Scott, and I want to share a quote
with you that I think will explain what's going on. Before I do, however,
I'd like to add something. When I mentioned the practical reasons the
Legal Advisers perceive a compliance pull of international law, the one I
forgot to mention was that the Legal Advisors believed that sometimes there
would be domestic, foreign, or international criminal legal responsibility for
violating international criminal law, and it was quite real. So, if we aren't
going to prosecute in the United States under our own statutes that
implement the Torture Conventions and the Geneva Convention which
require prosecution, then perpetrators could still face prosecution abroad.
For example, the International Criminal Comt has jurisdiction over any war
crimes or crimes against humanity committed in Afghanistan, which is a
State Party to the Rome Treaty, whether the perpetrators are Afghans or
Americans. Also, under the principle of universal jurisdiction, which
applies to grave breaches of the Geneva C~nventions and acts of torture,
European and Latin American courts may Issue an indictment and arrest
warrant to individual Americans involved in war crimes and torture. And
even just an indictment by one of those countries can render a person a
prisoner in his own country. Reportedly, Henry Kissinger doesn't travel to
certain countries anymore, because after Cluis Hitchens wrote the book, The
Indictment of Hemy Kissinger, several countries opened up criminal
investigations into his involvement in acts of torture and assassinations in
Latin America dming the Nixon Administration. And several countries
have ongoing criminal investigations into Rumsfeld and Y oo. There is also
the possibility of civil suits under the Alien Tort Statute in U.S. courts.
Now, here's the quote I was looking for. Nick Rostow, who served as
the Chief Counsel at the National Security Council during the first Bush
Administration and later as Chief Counsel to the U.S. Ambassador to the
UN, wrote recently:
Criticism of the United States on international law grounds is especially
notable because of the very nature of the United States as a country. The
United States is defmed by law. Its oaths or citizenship and office holding
are pledges to the Constitution, not to a flag, not to a territory, not to the
motherland or fatherland, and of course, not to a sovereign. The law
defines who an American is, and it binds each of us to every other. That is
part of the reason why the United States cannot long sustain foreign
policies at odds with international law. In the end, Americans will not
support them. The American people will ask "Is it legal?" before they ask
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any other question about foreign policy actions short of self-defense
against direct aggression. 41

Rostow's observation suggests that as long as policymakers, bureaucrats,
and the general public believe that compliance with international law is
important, this belief will have a significant impact on State decisionmaking. To prevent that, Posner and Goldsmith employ something akin to
George Orwell's concept of blaclc/white. 42 What they want to do is
convince the American people that binding international law really means
non-binding non-law. And they have a whole book that tries to explain
that international law is just like a non-binding letter of credit. It's just
politics. And if they say it over and over again, and if everybody reads it, if
the elite stari to read it, if the public starts to read it, if the academics start to
buy into it, then maybe we'll just hear international law and think
international politics. And that is absolutely key, because without doing
that the American people won't stand for their government being a lawless
government.
But what my book does is the exact opposite. It says, guess what? All
this stuff that's in Goldsmith and Posner's book is not based on reality. If
you look inside the black box, which for the first time ever we're opening
up, you see that government policymakers have-for at least the past thirty
years covered by our data-considered international law to be real and
important. And their lawyers have thought that as well. And so,
international law is not fake law. It's real law, and that's the moral of my
story tonight, and of our book.
Question:

When Professor Yoo returned to Berkeley, he was subject to a lot of student
protest, a lot of public protest, and I was wondering if you have followed
any of the things that are going on with him now, as he tries to assimilate
back into being just a professor, from the things he did.

Schmf
Yes, there was an effort by his colleagues to try to have his tenure removed,
but his Dean essentially said, "no, things that professors do when they work
for governments or international organizations when they are on leave
should not be held against them when they return." You know, in academia
there are basically only two things that will cause you to lose tenure. One is
41.
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to commit murder or rape. The other is to commit plagiarism. But
apparently if you counsel people to torture, that's not enough. And that's
what his Dean basically said-at least to the extent that it was done during a
leave.
I also want to mention that the Department of Justice is currently
undertaking an ethics probe into whether John Yoo violated ethical
standards. What I've been hearing is that the probe is likely to exonerate
him, and that scares me. I think this is pari of the Obama Administration's
policy; they want to be like Nelson Mandela after apartheid. They do not
want to look back; they want to look only forward. They realize that the
whole issue of trying to prosecute or punish Bush Administration officials
for torture would be extremely politically divisive. It gives ammunition to
the Republicans, and it will just mess up the message and derail health care,
the stimulus package, and the other things on President Obama's agenda.
And so, I think we're going to see John Yoo and the others getting a
pass. The reason that scares me can be smmnarized by the phrase, "those
you cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." There needs to
be an authoritative statement by the government, saying the legal advice of
the "War Cmmcil" was wrong; and it was wrong of the "War Council"
lawyers to cut the President off from the lawyers with the most expertise in
interpreting international law. Without that type of message, we are likely
to see something like this done again in the future.

[Editor's Note: A few months after Michael P. Scharfs speech, the results
of the U.S. Department of Justice's ethics probe were published, finding
that Yoo had in fact committed professional misconduct, 43 but the Associate
Deputy Attorney General overruled the recommendations of the probe. 44 ]

43. Office of Prof! Responsibility Report, supra note 3, at 252.
44. Memorandum from David Margolis, Assoc. Deputy Attorney Gen, to the
Attorney Gen, on Decision Regarding Objections to the Findings of Prof! Misconduct in the
Office of Prof! Responsibility Report 2 (Jan. 5, 2010), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov.hearings/pdf/DAGMargolisMemo l 00 l 05 .pdf

